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1. Introduction
1. 1 In ordinary speech, we make typical use of such a construction as the
there-construction (1a) or particular affirmative (1b) for the purpose of an existen-
tial statement.
(１)a. There is some book on the desk.
b. Some book is on the desk.
c. There exists some book on the desk.
d. There exists at least one book on the desk.
(1a) and its variant (1b) are true if and only if the proposition represented in
them corresponds to a given situation, and have the interpretations (1c) or (1d)
with a minimum reading of existence. This interpretation is represented as in
( 2 ) in terms of modern symbolic logic, with the reading that there is at least
one such that is a book and is on the desk.
(２) is on-the-desk］
This judgment or proposition asserts the existence of objects or entities whose
reference is made to by a term “” or a logical subject “book” as in (1a).
Negative particulars are also used to make a typical assertion of entities.
Observe the following.
(３)a. Some drugs are not effective.
b. There are some drugs that aren’t effective.
c. There exists at least one drug that isn’t effective.
d. There exists at least one drug that is noneffective.
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e. There are some noneffective drugs.
f. Some drugs are noneffective.
g. 
(3a) is traditionally called a negative particular, and it does imply entities. It is
roughly paraphrased as (3b). They have (3c) with its minimum reading that
there is at least one such that is a drug and isn’t effective. This is more or
less formally represented as in (3g). By and large (3d) is equivalent to (3c) in
meaning, and is realized as (3e) or (3f). It is indeed the case that (3a) is equiva-
lent to (3f) in that both of them assert the existence of an object or objects. For
ease of understanding, we use a Venn diagram.
(3a) is a contradiction of “All  is ” in which the existence of is denied
and therefore is asserted to be empty. (3a) thus makes an assertion that
 is not empty, or, there is at least one member of both being and . Or
more simply, the following calculus is given in terms of symbolic logic to show
a particular negative proposition (O) is equivalent to a particular affirmative
proposition (I) with a complement of the predicate in it.
( 5 ) 	
	
	
(where  stands for negation, and prime () for a complememt of a
given term.)
It thus indeed makes an assertion of entities. This also reveals that a negative
particular existentially implies .
1. 2 Ontology. Before we deliberate over the existential import of proposi-
tions in the framework of Formal Logic (or Aristotelian logic and its traditions),
to avoid unnecessary confusion, it is necessary here to notice a very important
though fundamental assumption that modern symbolic logic has radically differ-
ent views of ontology from Formal Logic. The latter clearly assumes, as we will
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(４) (rug) (ffective)

＊
see, that there should be entities allegedly named by terms (in propositions), by
which their existence is referred to. In modern logic, however, a term in a
proposition does not commit itself to entities, nor do names or descriptive
phrases for that matter. Russell, in his discussion of definite descriptions (1919)
and denoting phrases (1905), makes an assertion to the effect that a seeming
name and a descriptive phrase as such are not regarded to be the denotative, but
are paraphrased and decomposed in context of a given proposition. The only way
we can involve ourselves in ontological commitments in symbolic logic is to
make crucial use of variables (or variables of quantification). Consider, for ex-
ample,
( 6 ) 
(with and  for ‘human’ and ‘mortal’)
To affirm that ( 6 ) is true, we assign a value to a quantified variable . In the
value-assignment, if it is the case that , the members found in the in-
tersection of the sets, and , can be regaeded as entities. Modern logic thus
does not get involved in “reality”, nor commit itself to such metaphysical
disputes as we find, for example, in the annoying discussions of the Medieval
Ages.1)
1. 3 Formal Logic clearly is not a theory of quantification in a modern sense.
Among the distinguishing differences between modern symbolic logic and formal/
traditional logic is that the former entertains an adoption of Boolean interpreta-
tion of categorical propositions. As for particulars, however, modern symbolic
logic and formal logic have a common interpretation : “Some is ” is inter-
preted as “there exists at least one that is ”, or “there is at least one , and
it is a ” ; and “Some is not ” as “there exists at least one that is not ”,
or “there is at least one , and it is not a ”. Particulars thus do not deny the
existence of anything, but simply affirm that certain classes do have members.
The logical system with Boolean interpretation, however, has a quite different
treatment of universals from the one in Formal Logic. In ordinary speech, more
often than not we find ourselves taking the existence of a subject term for grant-
ed ; it is the case that the class designated by the term is not empty, as with
“humans” in “all humans are mortal”. The assumption that a term does not rep-
resent as an empty set is called the assumption of existential import for that term.
Existential import is not admitted in Boolean interpretation, which leads to the
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modern square of opposition in which a legitimate status is provided for nothing
but a contradiction. Subalternation legitimately admitted in the framework of
Aristotelian logic, for example, is rejected and abandoned due to the argument
that a subject term must be an empty set. Observe the following argument.
( 7 ) All husbands of Queen Elizabeth I were men.
Therefore, some husbands of Queen Elizabeth I were men.
From a historical viewpoint, the conclusion of this argument is evidently false,
for Queen Elizabeth I was not married and did not hava any husband. In any valid
argument it must be the case that no situation is to be found where premises are
true and at the same time conclusion is false : therefore, the premise of this ar-
gument ( 7 ) cannot be true. For it not to be true, the subject term of the prem-
ise, which is a universal affirmative, necessarily designates an empty set. This
makes us contend that universals do not affirm the existence of any individuals
within the intersection of subject and predicate, but simply deny the existence of
certain kinds of individuals in the class of subject, which is among basic ideas of
modern symbolic logic.
It is a standard convention of modern logic that it deals with universals as hy-
pothetical, without any existential assmption. Manicas and Kruger (1976) are
among recent writers who try to get by with this idea. Such a univeasal affirma-
tive as “all UFO’s are flying saucers” is formulated as,
( 8 ) 
(where stands for UFO’s and for flying saucers.)
This hypothetical formulation of universal affirmatives guarantees that given the
empty setφ, i.e. “”, or even if the antecedent falls into falsehood, ( 8 ) is still
to be true, for any instantiation of the conditional of this quantified formula is al-
ways true, with the antecedent false. This is responsible for the fact that we are
able to refer to “unreal” entities and enables us to make the statements involved
true in our ordinary speech.
1. 4 The modern view still yields an enigma. Again, modern logic’s treatment
of universals as hypotheticals is coupled with a blunt rejection of existential as-
sumption. Let us take a look at the following inference.
( 9 ) All humans are mortal.
Therefore, some humans are mortal.
Now not assuming existential import, the Boolean interpretation of universals
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has to account for this inference, or subalternation if you like, as valid. That ( 9 )
is valid means that the following logical conditional is tautologous.
(10) 
That (10) is a tautology means that no single case is to be found in which, given
a false consequent of the conditional (10), an antecedent happens to be true.
The contradiction of the consequent of (10) is given as (11a).
(11)a. 	
b. 	
(11a) is logically equivalent to (11b).
［Proof］
(12) 	
	
［Ⅰ］ １  	 Ａ
１  	 １ Law of Quantifier Negation
１  	 ２ UE
１  	 ３ De Morgan
１  	 ４ Def. of Implication
１  	 ５ UI
［Ⅱ］ １  	 Ａ
１  	 １ UE
１  		 ２ Def. of Implicstion
１  	 ３ De Morgan
１  	 ４ UI
１  	 ５ Law of Quantifier Negation
▲
Given (11b), which is a contradiction of the consequent of the implication (10),
the antecedent of (10) must not be true so that (10) can be tautologous : Evi-
dently (11b) and the antecedent of (10) are contradictory : (11b) states that all
that have do not have ; whereas the antecedent of (10) states that all that
havedo have. We find therefore that (10) is a tautology and the argument
thus is valid.
Still, in practical contexts, the modern view yields a very bizarre result.
Observe the following diagrams.
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Any interpretation of the I proposition, modern or Aristotelian, undoubtedly as-
serts the existence of a human () : “there is at least one human being such that
she / he is mortal.” According to the modern interpretation of the A proposition,
however, no existence of humans is assumed, and interpreted merely as stating
that if anyone is a human, she / he is mortal. We thus cannot validly infer the I
proposition (9a) from the A proposition(9b).
2. Blanket assumption? The tradition of Formal or Aristotelian Logic as-
sumes four categorical propositions of a specific form:
universal affirmative (proposition A: “All is ”, or more simply )
universal negative (proposition E: “No is ”, or more simply )
particular affirmative (proposition I : “Some is ”, or more simply )
particular negative (proposition O: “Some is not ”, or more simply
)
We then confine ourselves to asking whether or not the existence of an object
(or thing) referred to by a subject term is implied in universal propositions, that
is, whether the universal propositions carry existential import or not. Or could
it possibly be the case that existential import is interpreted to be more compre-
hensive, that is, not only subjects but also predicates are existentially implied in
universals? Or could it possibly be the case that other possibilities pop up in our
scene?
The Formal Logic insists that there should be some dependence between a
universal affirmative and an existential affirmative ; and according to the square
of opposition, it is interpreted as subalternation by which if the superaltern is
true, the subaltern is true and not necessarily vice versa. What this tells us is
that the subject in universal affirmatives should be existentially implied. What
results from subalternation is obtained by the application of “conversion by
limitation” to the A proposition, and then that of “pure conversion” to the very
result. The output is , in which the subject is indeed implied, and so is the
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A: I :
(uman)  (ortal)  
＊
subjectof the original A proposition due to consecutive rule applications. Here
we could ask ourselves whether or not the predicates of A proposition are exis-
tentially implied as well. What about universal negatives? Putting it another
way, the question in order is whether or not we could make a comprehensive or
blanket assumption on existential import of universal propositions.
2. 1 What we are concerned with in this section is to make a brief survey of
recent writers’ views of existential import, and point out that they lack consis-
tency. More importantly, their contentions are not what follows from principles.
Modern logic, based on Boolean interpretation, presupposes that nothing but
contradiction be taken into consideration in the square of opposition ; whereas
Aristotelian logic and its traditions hold that in addition there be contrary,
subcontrary, subalternation, conversion by limitation, and contraposition by limi-
tation. As mentioned above, the latter assumes that universals imply particulars
via subalternation : a universal affirmative, for example, implies a particular af-
firmative, and the former displays existential implication in its subject, for what
is existentially implied must originally be preserved in what implies it.
Now it must be noticed that four categorical propositions are all likely to be in-
volved in at most four terms designating classes ; subject, predicate, and non-
subject, non-predicate (which are abbreviated as , , , and , respectively,
with a prime symbol as an indication of the complement). When we deal with ex-
istential import, we naturally ask ourselves, do these classes all have members?
2. 2 A bit of survey of previous literatures. TableI shows a fragment of our
examination of what logic writers remark as to existential assumption in
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   
Johnson (1992) ○
Hurley (1988) ○
Guttenplan and Tamny (1971) ○
Byerly (1973) ○
Cohen and Nagel (1993) ○ ○
Tidman and Kahane (1999) ○ ○
(TableⅠ)
universal proposition. Even this small scrutiny reveals that opinions vary from
writer to writer, and they have a apparent lack of consistency. Many of the writ-
ers make a typical assumption that only the subject terms represents a nonempty
set. Johnson (1992), for example, says that : “The traditional square of opposi-
tion is based on the existential assumption that members of the subject class do
exist.” Others insist that we tacitly take for granted the existence of members
of the classes denoted by the terms (subject and predicate) of the universal
proposition. Tidman and Kahane (1999) make a definitive assertion that : “A
proposition is said to have existential import if its subject and predicate are taken
to refer to classes that are not empty.”
Besides those possible choices, other options are possibly available ;
(13)a. comprehensive assumption (, , , and )
b. , , and 
c. , , and 
and so on. As we will see later on, our option is (13c), and a good reason (or
principles) will be given for this choice. Now, a fundamental discussion of the
universe of discourse is in order, for it is a useful preliminary to the whole pro-
ject of the choice we will make as to existential import of the propositions.
3. Existential assumptions made by the writers that we have examined so far
are by no means what follow from any principles, but rather are nothing but
abhoc treatments. Any induction from them does not seem to give us any prin-
cipled explanation. Our proposal should be made in favor of a more deductive ap-
proach.
3. 1 A proposition has a content which in truth-value assignment is matched
up with a given situation ; and so a proposition is to talk about or make reference
to some thing or things, and for this purpose there are supposed to be some en-
tity in a universe. It is an essential presupposition that the universe, , is the
only domain in which we can make propositions or judgments.
We assume that there is nothing but a singleand that it is not empty. Here
we have to point out that a  and the complement never constitute the whole
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(14)a. 
as in (14b), that is,
This is restated as ;
(14)c. 
and if it is the case that (14c) holds true, then there can be a possibility in which
the inside  is empty and is not empty at the same time ; whereas, the out-
saide cannot be empty, for we talk about entities : so that if (14c) is the case,
we run into a contradiction.
Why is the  not empty? Statements are inevitably involved in affirmation
and denial. For denial there should be at least one entity in the  : otherwise
what is to be denied is not available to making the statement. That a  is not
empty means that it has at least one member, real or unreal, somewhere in its
domain. Denial of judgments is recognized to be among our typical, mental ac-
tivities. Suppose that one () admits existence of an entity, and the other ()
tries to assert nonexistence of the entity :  then is forced into admitting from
the scratch that there should be an entity whose existence has admitted. s
admitting the entity to be existent in the , makes it possible for  to make a
statement of denial of its existence : it is not until  admits that it exists in the
 that  can deny it. , however, then finds himself / herself to be in direct
contradiction, for admits and denies its existence all at once. In what follows,
we presupposes that there is an entity in the upon denial of, as well as asser-
tion of, its existence2)
In deliberating over the old problem of existential import in the framework of
Formal Logic, we will here work on the assumption that a term cannot be dealt
with independently of a proposition in which it is included as a subject and / or a
predicate, and that a term designates a class ; otherwise there is a horrendous
metaphysical problem. In what follows, our focus will be on the discussion of ex-
istential implication of a term in a judgment or a proposition, with special refer-
ence to Aristotelian logic and its traditions.
It has been shown that given athere should be some objects in the domain.
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(14)b. 


A statement in the form of categoricals is made for the purpose of how the ob-
jects are allocated, in an affirmative or negative form, in the  for particular
categoricals. Terms, subjects or predicates, in the categoricals talk about entities
in a  in such a way that they are designated in terms of attributes. When we
talk about, say, the students in our mind, we assume the universe of discourse
 to be of students. Let “” stand for the attribute of being a student, and
“” for a woman. The conjunction  represents a class of objects such that
they have the attribute of both being student and being woman. Given respective
complements as well, , ,  and  constitute the entire universe
as is shown in (15).
In other words, the  is divided into four compartments and as we saw it, some
entities are always to be found somewhere in the. Notice, however, that those
compartments are nothing but formal and necessary and each of the compart-
ments as such, however, never make reference to how and where entities find
themselves allocated in the .
In what way are entities located in a ? Propositions are responsible for an-
swering this question and fulfill the duty by talking about the “quantity” or
“quality” of the categorical form of propositions. They assert that there exists no
, for example, which means they in an absolute sense refer to “universal” in
a negative form; and for this particular purpose “No is  ”.
Our contention again is that there should be at least one entity in a given do-
main of universe. This means that no possibility can be found in which, as
Keynes (1906) mentions, with the very limited universe every compartment is
simultaneously empty. If Keynes is correct,  +++ is empty ;
that is, the universe would probably be empty. Successive destruction of the four
classes ultimately leads us to an empty . This, however, means that the 
itself has become extinct, and any categorical is entirely deprived of what it could
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(15)



  
  
  
talk about. In order for a categorical to resume its capability to make a state-
ment, even in an indefinitely diminutive universe, there should remain a particu-
lar proposition ; there thus should always be at least one entity in a .
Modern symbolic logic is not concerned with the idea that a universe of dis-
course is not empty. Take for example. For this to be
true, there must at least one thing such that it is both and . More generally,
a necessary and sufficient condition for to be true is that there
should be at least one object in the world which corresponds to .
3. 2 In this section some basic idea of Carroll’s grid approach is briefly pro-
vided for a further discussion. A  is a universe of discourse. For the specifica-
tion of classes, a  is divided by attributes (or species) on the basis of
dichotomy. Given an attribute , for example, then we obtain a grid (16a).
If there is at least one entity in the upper compartment with the attribute , we
draw “1” in there, so that we obtain the grid like (16b), representing that there
is at least one entity such that it has a property of being ; more simply, there
is some .
In order to make an assertion that there is nothing in the same compartment, a
circle is drawn in there, so that we obtain the grid like (16c), representing that
there is no such that it has a property of being .
Given two attributes and , then we have a blank grid like (16d).
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(16)a.
(where stands for the complement of )


(16)b.


(16)c.


Now according to Venn (1881 :161), when we meet with the universal affirma-
tive (“All is ”) we will understand it to be interpreted as follows :
(17)a. negatively and absolutely, ‘there are no such things as (＝0)
b. positively and conditionally, ‘If there are such things as, then all the
are ’ (＝1)
In accordance with Venn’s interpretation of “All is ”, we regard (17a) as
more fundamental, so that the universal affirmative is transformed into (18a)
with a circle in the compartment .
In a similar way a grid for a universal negative is given with a circle in the com-
partment xy as in (18b) ; it represents that “No is ”.
With a grid like (18b) with two attributesand, there could be two possibili-
ties where “1” is located as follows :
(19)a. “1” is squarely placed right into an appropriate compartment
b. “1” is indeterminately placed on a dividing line
(19a) is not problematic in interpretation. What about (19b)? Consider (19c).
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(16)d.


 
(18)a.


 
(18)b.


 
“1” is on the line, or “betwixt and between”. This represents an “on-the-fence”
situation in which we can not decide whether falls into or into : or we are
not in a position to commit ourselves to the precise allocation of entities : we are
not sure of where they are located in the , or .
3. 3 With these preparatory remarks in mind, let us consider the existential
import of a given proposition. We have seen that particular categoricals assert
existence of entities with respect to a given : so we confine ourselves to uni-
versals. We also have already seen the reasons for our rejection of Keynes’ the-
ory, and reached the conclusion that all the compartments in a given domain of
discourse cannot be simultaneously empty. We more preferably entertain an idea
that we expect there to be at least one entity in a. Now given (18a) of the pre-
vious section with a negative and absolute interpretation of a universal affirma-
tive, there could be five positions which “1” (or being existent) will be able to
occupy, as indicated in (20).
Observe that
“1” of (a), (c), and (e) is placed right into a compartment.
“1” of (b) and (d) is “on the fence”.
It is crucially important to notice first that the “1” of (c) is deprived of its candi-
dacy for existential import : for it is ambiguously located in, and it is impossi-
ble to determine where the “1” of (c) is exactly located, or . Whenever a
proposition is given in the standard form of simple categoricals, what has existen-
tial import is supposed to be a single term (grammatically speaking, simple
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(19)c.


 
(20)


 





subject or simple predicate) in a given proposition, but not a combinatory term
of subject and predicate such as .
Now take the “1” of (b) for example. This “1” is indeterminately positioned
: it is on the fence. We cannot tell to which compartment it belongs, which
means that it clearly does not have any status for existential assumption. The
same is true of the “1” of (d).
Finally let us take a look at the “1” of (a). At first glance, (a) seems to be in
combinatory position, ; it, however, turns out to be squarely in , but not in
, because (a) is located nothing but the whole . Where (a) is located is the
whole because of the fact that another half of the class is designated to be
empty, as a circle in indicates. In a similar way, the “1” of (e) turns out to
be in .
Our conclusion is that, given “Allis”,andare qualified to be what has
existential import : more exactly, the classes designated by the subjectand the
complement of the predicate are not empty. We observe that what the “1” lo-
cated on the fence tells us is excluded from candidacy from existential assump-
tion of a given proposition because of its indeterminacy : and we propose the
following ;
(21) Anti “on-the-fence” hypothesis :
The “1” (or being existent) is capable of having existential import in a
given proposition if and only if it is unambiguously interpretd ; it thus is not
on the fence or does not assume a position of combinatory attributes.
The hypothesis (21) predicts that the universal negative would have and as
existential import. From (18b) of the previous section, we can form (22) with
“1”’s on every position imaginable.
(22) is subject to the hypothesis (21), so that we identify the “1”’s of (a) and
(e) as a legitimate candidates. “No is ” thus has existentential implications,
and .
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(22)


 





3. 4 Summary
Two assumptions are proposed for prediction of existential import in a given
(universal) proposition.
(A) An assumption of nonempty universe
All the compartments in a given universe can not be simultaneously
empty : there thus must always be at least one entity in the whole .
(B) Anti “on-the-fence” hypothesis [=(21)]
The “1” (or being existent) is capable of having existential import in a
given proposition if and only if it is unambiguously interpreted ; it thus is
not on the fence or does not assume a position of combinatory attributes.
What remains to be done is a careful scrutiny of several assumptions on the
square of opposition and on some immediate inferences particular to Aristotelian
logic, and to see if our assumptions (A) and (B) do work to save a traditional
framework of Aristotelian logic : that is, to see if the assets to us will be success-
fully deduced from our hypothesis.
4 Our purpose in this section is to make every attempt to preserve
Aristotelian views on some immediate relationships between the four categorical
propositions. To accomplish this task, our proposal is that the assumptions (A)
and (B) should be able to predict any valid immediate arguments : and the clas-
sical logic is thus salvaged from unprincipled treatments. The result is provided
that a blanket assumption of existential import is not correct, but as for existen-
tial implication of the universals there should be an asymmetry only in terms of
the predicate : for existential import,
(C1) the proposition A has the subject and the complement of the predicate
(C2) the proposition E has the subject and the predicate
(C3) A complement of the subject thus is simply excluded among the candi-
dates.
4. 1 To be more concrete, in what follows we will examine how correctly and
effectively valid immediate arguments with universals are, featured in
Aristotelian traditions ;
1) subalternation
2) contrary
3) contradiction
4) conversion by limitation (A to I )
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5) contraposition by limitation (E to O)
will be deduced from our assumptions (A) and (B).
4. 1. 1 Given, then(by subalternation). This inference could be con-
firmed to be valid : and thus from , which is given to be true, is transformed
into by contrary, so that the latter is false ; and its contradiction is , and
it should be true, indeed. (23) is our illustration of with existential import
involved in it.
Given (23), it is indeed easy to see being true.
(23) also shows that follows from ; that is, given , then 
should be true. That this is the case is confirmed from a successive application
of the rules concerned, such as ;
1)  (T)
2)  ［by contraposition］ (T)
3)  ［by contrary］ (F)
4)  ［by contradicition］ (T)
5)  ［by conversion］ (T)
Given , then follows : and that this is the case is confirmed as follows ;
1)  (T)
2)  ［by conversion］ (T)
3)  ［by contrary］ (F)
4)  ［by contradiction］ (F)
According to our assumptions (A) and (B), (24), with existential import (and
) involved in the proposition , is given.
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(23)


 
(24) includes , which is equivalent to the conclusion after all.
Given (24), then we can also predict that is followed from : and this
inference is valid because of a series of rule-application like ;
1)  (T)
2)  ［by obversion］ (T)
3)  ［by contrary］ (F)
4)  ［by contradiction］ (T)
4. 1. 2 The relation, contrary, is the one between A and E in which the one
is true, and the other is false, or both of them can be simultaneously false ; that
is,
 if A is true, E is false
 if E is true, A is false
or, A and E are both false
Consider the following examples.
(25)a. All logicians are intelligent.
b. No logician is intelligent.
(25a) and (25b) are translated into (26a) and (26b), respectively.
(26)a. 
b. 
(where stands for “logician” and for “intelligent”.)
It is evident that if the diagram (27a) is tthe case, (27b) is the case, and vice
versa : that is, there is always a contradiction on “”.
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(24)


 
(27)a. (27)b.


  


Now imagine the possible situation like,
(28)a. Some logicians are intelligent, AND
b. Some logicians are not intelligent.
They are diagrammed like,
(29)a. proposition (29)b. proposition
Notice that the proposition does not necessarily imply the A proposition be-
cause “○” (or being empty) cannot be secured in the compartment in the
proposition (29a) ; and the O proposition does not necessarily imply the 
proposition because “○” cannot be secured in the compartment in the 
proposition (29b). Given the situation “(28a)(28b)”, (25a) and (25b) are
both false.
We very briefly touch upon contradictories here with reference to the dia-
grams, (27a), (27b), (29a) and (29b), but only in passing. Contradictories have
exact opposite truth-values. Given the truth of the  proposition, then the 
proposition is false, and vice versa. If the I proposition is true, then the E propo-
sition is false, and vice versa : and it is very easy to read those relations on the
diagrams.
4. 1. 3 Conversion by limitation as in (30) can be proved to be valid.
The universal affirmative (31), with existential import, explicitly indicates that
follows from it, for one of the “1” s occupies in it, which means that
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

  


(30) 	
 
(31)


 
Some is ”. This is equivalent to “Some is ” by pure conversion, so that
(31) is a valid inference. The validity of (31) is also confirmed in such a conven-
tional way as :
1)  (T)
2)  ［by contrary］ (F)
3)  ［by conversion］ (F)
4)  ［by contradiction］ (T)
4. 1. 4 is derived from by the application of contraposition by limi-
tation. The universal negative, , has as existential imports, and . That
is existentially implies in this proposition means that it has the “1” occupies
, and this is interpreted as “Some is ”. The conventional proof guaran-
tees that this is the case :
1)  (T)
2)  ［by obversion］ (T)
3)  ［by contrary］ (F)
4)  ［by contradiction］ (T)
, given by our assumption of existential import, is consecutively transformed
into as follows :
1)  (T)
2)  ［by conversion］ (T)
3)  ［by obversion］ (T)
The whole inference thus turns out to be valid.
5. We have been dealing so far with immediate arguments, but not any of the
indirect arguments, that is, what is traditionally called syllogisms. Our concern
in this section is whether or not our existential assumptions (A) and (B) serve
to find out which syllogisms are valid. The conventional assumption is that there
are 24 valid syllogisms, and 7 out of them are called “weakened moods”, and 2
“strengthened moods”. We are not concerned here with discussion of definition
of those moods, but suffice it here to say that existential import is required one
way or another for them to be valid. Just for convenience, we provide the follow-
ing table of allegedly valid syllogisms.
On Existential Import
― ―63
Each of those syllogisms is provided in the form of :
(32) major premise
minor premise
therefore, conclusion
Notice that what the 9 syllogisms in the W-Group all have in common is that
each of them has two universal premises and a conclusion in the form of particu-
lars. A particular proposition in the conclusion asserts entities : so that no possi-
bility can be allowed to arise in which all the terms (, , and ) can be
simultaneously empty, for any assertion of entities in the conclusion is supposed
to be deduced from the true premises that refer to entities ; or nonentities do not
bear entities. To be more exact, it is required that there be entities or the terms
designating the class that includes them in the premises, and they not contradict
the entities asserted to exist in conclusion in the form of a particular proposition.
The other 15 syllogisms in the B-Group are alleged to be valid on the basis of
Boolean interpretation, without any existential import in a given proposition.
5. 1 Now our concerns in this section are ;
 to propose the procedure responsible for proving validity of a given syllo-
gism from our hypothesis (C1), (C2) and (C3)
 to see if our approach will predict what is a required existential import, if
any, of a given syllogism.
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figureⅠ figureⅡ figureⅢ figureⅣ
B
Barbara
Celarent
Darii
Ferio
Cesare
Camestres
Festino
Baroco
Disamis
Datisi
Bocardo
Ferison
Calemes
Fresison
Dimatis
W
Barbari (S)
Celaront (S)
Cesaro (S)
Camestrop (S)
Darapti (M)
Felapton (M)
Bamalip (P)
Fesapo (M)
Camenos (S)
(where in parenthesis stands for existential import in a given syllogism:stands
for a minor term, for a major term, and  for a middle term.)
(TableⅡ)
The basic procedure is presented in a more schematic flowchart as :
5. 5. 1 As indicated in TableⅡ a subject is existentially assumed in Barbari,
Celaront, Cesaro, Camestrop, and Camenos. Take Celaront (figure- I) for exam-
ple. It conventionally assumes the form of :
In order to confirm that this syllogism includes an existentially assumed in its
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(33) () Major premise () Minor premise
①
②
③ ④ ④③
②
①
biliteral
translation
(where ① and ② are the subject and the complement of the subject in a given
categorical, respectively ; and ③ and ④ are the predicate and the complement
of the predicate in a given categorical, respectively.)


 


 
superimposing
reduction to biliteral
Reading () for the conclusion
()
triliteral
translation

(34) 

 
premises, we take a brief look at the proof in terms of symbolic logic. If we trans-
late this syllogism Celaront into sequent of symbolic logic, then we have the fol-
lowing :
	

Notice that is additionally located in the premise.
［Proof］
1   A
2   A
3   A
4   A
2   2 UE
2, 4   4, 5 MP
1   1 UE
1, 4   4, 7 MP
1, 2, 4 	 
 6, 8 & I
1, 2, 4 
 
 9 EI
1, 2, 3  
 3, 4, 10 EE
▲
According to (C2), the major premise is represented as in (35a).
(35a) reads that “No is” with andfor existential implications involved
in it, which is represented in the trileteral (35b).
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(35)a.


 
(35)b.
 

The minor premise  is (35c) according to our (C1).
(35c) reads that “Allis” with the existentially assumedandinvolved
in it, which is diagrammed as in the following triliteral (35d).
Superimposing (35b) onto (35d) makes is possible for us to draw the triliteral
diagram (35e).
(35f) is interpreted as “No is ” . With our proposed approach, from
we derive , instead of the expected conclusion . Our
approach seems at first glance to have something wrong with it : However, it
turns out to be more predictive. Given as premises, then
is given for a conclusion, as our approach predicts : and this indeed corre-
sponds to valid syllogism Celarent (figure I - EAE) in B-Group. The conclusion
of Celarent entails a particular negative by subalternation ; so that we have
also a valid syllogism Celaront which we started off with for inspection of the va-
lidity. Our method derives not only Calarent but Celaront, which requires
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(35)c.


 
(35)d.



(35)e. (35)f.



 
 



existential import.
How could we find that Calaront has an “” as existential import? The conclu-
sion of the syllogism is , and it is rewritten as in the following way :
 (T)
 ［by contradiction］ (F)
 ［by obversion］ (F)
 ［by contradiction］ (T)
means that “there is at least one and it is ” ; and can be also con-
verted into , which means “there is at least one and it is ”. or is
thought to be existent in the conclusion, and here we ask which is existentially
implied in the premises involved. Now look back at our premises, and we will
understand that existence of is assumed. It is clear that existence of as-
sumed in the conclusion is guaranteed in terms of an existential “1” in the upper
left compartment of the premise (35c), which is provided for due to our (C1).
Our system so far accounts for what is expected in the valid syllogism Celaront.
The conclusion of Celarent (or a negative universal) cannot be said to have
existential import, as with Celaront. Notice that entailment from superaltern
to subaltern does not necessarily guarantee the logical equivalence between
them. This means that the same existential import as Celaront is not logically
assumed to be the existential import of Celarant, and the latter does not have any
existential import ; and thus belongs to the B-Group.
Now observe again a pair of Cerarent and Celaront :
(36) Celarent Celaront


 


 
Those syllogisms have some defining characteristics :
the premises are all universals
the relation of subalternation is found between them in terms of the con-
clusions.
Those characteristics lead us to the possibility that the syllogisms with A for a
conclusion also entail those with I for a conclusion : that is, once we get the for-
mer type of valid syllogisms, the latter type also turns out to be valid. With this
in mind, we find other similar pairs with respect to TableⅡ: as for FigureI,
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Barbara-Barbari ; as for FigureⅡ, Cesare-Cesaro, and Camestres-Camestrop ;
and as for FigureⅣ, Calemes-Camenos. Notice that the former categorical of
each pair has a universal conclusion and falls into the B-Group ; and the latter
categorical has a particular conclusion and falls into the W-Group. As far as a
conclusion is concerned, each latter syllogism of those pairs has a subaltern of
the corresponding conclusions (A or E) : and it thus must be(orby con-
version), or (or , or by conversion), which ensures that , , or
should be given as existential import of a given syllogism.
With respect to (35e), seems to be an alleged conclusion for Celaront.
Now observe :
(37) 
oris therefore expected to be existentially implied somewhere in the prem-
ises. is not located anywhere in the premises ; and thus our (C3) seemingly
is respected. , on the other hand, is located : the “1” in implies existence
of because  is the whole domain of with respect to (35a) : so that
 is admitted to be a correct conclusion. If this is the case, as is shown in
(37), the logical equivalenceshould be also admitted to be a correct conclu-
sion for Celaront to be valid, and this forces us to admit thatis existentially as-
sumed after all. For the avoidance of this dilemma, we delete the “1” of in
(35f) after the interpretation of proposition. (35f) is then transformed into
(38a)’.
In addition to this kind of situation, the possibility is likely to arise in which
such a situation as (38b) is given in a syllogism.
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(35)f. (38)a.


  



This is a possible conclusion : and it is exactly the conclusion involved in a pair
of Barbara and Barbari as we will see later. By the same token as a pair of
Celarent and Celaront, the “1” ofof (38b) must be excluded from there : so
that in our system, after the interpretation of reading universal affirmative from
(38b), the “1” ofis deleted : and we thus have the grid for entailed interpre-
tation (Barbari) :
Our contention has a kind of filtering function like :
(D) Ellipsis of :
In the conclusion of a syllogism, any “1”, located somewhere in the com-
plement of the subject, undergoes deletion, after reading of, if any, the
universals.
This filter (D) should be regaeded as different from (C3), which applies on the
scratch of our procedure. It seems necessary to assume that (D) should apply
after reducing triliteral to biliteral diagram, because an implicit , in the sense
that we have mentioned above, could possibly come into being in the procedure.
5. 1. 2 In what follows we show how the rest of the syllogisms which require
thatbe existentially assumed will be explained : how (C1 /2 /3) are respon-
sible for the validity of Barbari, Cesaro, Camestrop, and Camenos. In what fol-
lows, for brevity and clarity, explanation will be provided in more schematic
fashion.
5. 1. 2. 1 Barbara and Barbari :
We start off with Barbara in the B-Group.
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(38)b.


 
(38)c.


 
It is easy to confirm that Barbara is valid and does not require any existential as-
sumption :

［Proof］
1   A
2   A
1   1 UE
2   2 UE
1, 2   4, 3 Hypothetical Syllogism
1, 2   5 UI
▲
Our flowchart goes like :
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(39) 

 
(40)

	
 	
superimposing
triliteral
translation

 	

	
 	

	
Barbara
()Proposition A
bileteral
translation
 	
()Proposition A
(40 iii) reads that “All S is P ” (SaP), which is the conclusion given in this syl-
logism, Barbara : (40 iii) is then translated into (40 iv) by (D). (40 iv) gives us
: so that this makes Barbari valid. should have been installed some-
where in the premises : andis found in of the (40 ii) so thatis regarded
as existential import of Barbari.
5. 1. 2. 2 Cesare and Cesaro :
Cesare is of the form:
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

 
reduction to biliteral
()


 

(D)
()
(41) 

 
(42)
superimposing
triliteral
translation

 


 


Cesare
()Proposition E
bileteral
translation
 
()Proposition A


(42 iii) reads that “No is ” , which is the conclusion of Cesare. It is
from this Cesare’ conclusion thatcan derived by subalternation. This is ex-
actly the conclusion of Cesaro.is expected to be existentially assumed ; and
is indeed found in  of the premise (42 ii).
5. 1. 2. 3 Camestres and Camestrop :
Camestres is of the form:
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

 


 
()


 

(D)
()
reduction to biliteral
(43) 

 
(44)
superimposing
triliteral
translation

 


 


Camestres
()Proposition A
bileteral
translation
 
()Proposition E


Again, entails : and we therefore obtain the valid syllogism Camestrop
as well as Cametres. What is expected for existential import is an in this case
as well due to the fact that the “1” in of (44 ii).
5. 1. 2. 4 Calemes and Camenos :
Calemes is of the form:
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

 


 
()


 

(D)
()
reduction to biliteral
(45) 

 
(46)
superimposing
triliteral
translation

 


 


()Proposition A
bileteral
translation
 
Calemes
()Proposition E


(46 iii) is of the same situation as a pair of Camestres and Camestrop : so that
this tells us that Calemes and Camenos are both valid and the latter has anfor
existential import. We can conclude that an is existentially assumed : that is,
, as a premise, is added to 
5. 1. 3 In Darapti (figureI AAI), something or someone is assumed to have
a middle term; that is, some “” is existentially implied : so that it is restated
as in the following sequent in terms of symbolic logic.
	
Notice that is added for existential import in the sequent. Validity of
this sequent is confirmed in such a way as :
［Proof］
1   A
2   A
3   A
4   A
1   1 UE
1, 4   4, 5 MP
2   2 UE
2, 4 	  4, 7 MP
1, 2, 4 
  8, 6 &I
1, 2, 4   9 EI
1, 2, 3   3, 4, 10 EE
▲
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


 




 

()



 


(D)
reduction to biliteral
Now, Darapti is given in the conventional form of :
According to our approach, the major premise is represented as in (48a)
on the ground of our hypothesis (C1) and (C3).
(48a) reads that “All is” with andincluded as existential implications
in it, which is represented in Carroll’s triliteral diagram as in (48b).
The minor premiseis represented as in (48c) also on the ground of (C1)
and (C3).
(48c) reads that “All  is ” with  and included as existential implications
in it. This situation forces us to draw an elliptical diagram (48d) without the
“1” in . The result is diagrammed as in the triliteral (48e).
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(47) 

 
(48)a.


 
(48)b.
 

(48)c. (48)d.


  



(D)
Conjunction of both premises makes it possible for us to superimpose (48b) onto
(48e) and vice versa ; and we have the triliteral diagram (48f).
Notice that on (48f) the “1”’s “on the fence” are eliminated from the diagram
(48g) because those “1”’s are not entitled to a full-swing existential import, as
we have seen. The triliteral diagram (48f) is thus reduced to biliteral diagram
(48g) ; and this shows that “Someis”, which is precisely a given con-
clusion of the original syllogism.
Now close observation reveals that the diagrams (48a) and (48c), which are
drawn according to our hypothesis (C1), have in common. An “” is existen-
tially assumed in the diagrams (48a) and (48c), respectively, and thoseas-
sociate one with the other in such a way that each of them serves as a medium
for the association of P as inon (48a) andas inon (48c). This means
that existentially assumed s (subjects in proposition A, in this case) serve to
guarantee validity of Darapti ; and therefore render correct our hypothesis (C
1).
The same type of argument in favor of Felapton (figureIII) and Fesapo (fig-
ureIV) could be given, though the details for them are omitted here.
5. 1. 4 Bamalip (figureIV) is the only syllogism that required the predicate to
be existentially assumed. The following sequent must, therefore, be valid ; and
we will find it is indeed.
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(48)e.



(48)f. (48)g.



 
 



	
Notice that is added for existential import in this sequent. Validity
of this sequent can be proven in such a way as :
［Proof］
1   A
2   A
3   A
4   A
1   1 UE
1, 4   4, 5 MP
2   2 UE
2, 4   4, 7 MP
1, 2, 4 	 	 8, 6 &I
1, 2, 4 
 	 9 EI
1, 2, 3  	 3, 4, 10 EE
▲
Bamalip should thus demand that something have , or the class designated by
not be empty.
Bamalip assumes the form of :
Major premise have the following diagram according to our hypothesis (C1).
(50a) reads that “All is ” with and 
as existential import. This is rep-
resented in the trileteral (50b).
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(49) 

 
(50)a.



 

The minor premise is (50c) according to our (C1) again.
(50c) reads that “All is” with andas existential import involved in it :
so that the “1” in is omitted. As a result, (50d) is given, and this is dia-
grammed as in the triliteral (50e).
If we superimpose (50b) onto (50e), we have the triliteral diagram (50f),
which is “there is at least one and no is ” in Carroll’s interpretation.
The (50f) is reduced to the biliteral (50g), which is interpreted simply as “Some
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(50)b.

 
(50)c. (50)d.


  



(C3)
(50)e.



(50)f. (50)g.



 
 



is ”. The conclusion of this syllogism shows that or is existent because
means “there is at least one and it is ”
means “there is at least one and it .”
This means that there is supposed to be or somewhere in either premise.
Our (C1) assumes a “1” of  in (50a) is existent and this guarantees that
is existentially assumed in the  : the “1” is thus reduced to constitute the
entiredue to the fact thatis empty. Our approach is found to predict not
only that Bamalip is valid but is exstentially assumed in the syllogism.3)
6. Conclusion.
Our discussion centered upon what could be done to preserve traditional views
of logic. A given universe is not an empty domain, but one in which there is at
least one entity that a categorical proposition refers to for making a statement ;
and that existential import is implied only by a singular term. We saw then that
it is from these considerations that we hypothesize (C1), (C2), and (C3), as-
sociated with existential import.
(C1) the proposition A has the subject and the complement of the predicate
(C2) the proposition E has the subject and the predicate
(C3) A complement of the subject thus is simply excluded among the candi-
dates.
Our examination proved that they work out to account for the validity of some re-
lations on the traditional square of opposition, and some immediate inferences.
We also proposed the deletion of (D) to the effect that, in the conclusion of
a syllogism, any “1”, located somewhere in the complement of the subject, un-
dergoes deletion, after reading of, if any, the universals. It also turned out that,
coupled with the additional assumption (D), (C1), (C2), and (C3) are re-
sponsible for
deriving validly categorical syllogisms,
and, in turn, checking the validity of a given categorical syllogism.
Additionally, as it turns out, our proposal makes a good prediction of what exis-
tential import is required for each of the nine weakened moods.
NOTES
1) As for the ontological discussions of the medieval times, refer to Weinberg
(1964), and Imamichi, T., K. Nakayama, S. Miwa, and K. Udo (1980).
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Interestingly, Uriagereka (1998) points out on “the Second Day” that there
could be a possibility in which the modern logical views comes across a stumbling
block to their ontological theory. Russell’s theory of descriptions could not provide
for the interpretation of the following.
Himiko doesn’t exist.…(i)
According to Russell’s theory, (i) would be given the following possible construals :
It is the case that there is a unique which is a himiko and it is not the case
that exists. …(ii)
 It is not the case that there is a unique which is a himiko and exists.
…(iii)
(ii) is excluded because it is evidently a contradiction. The remaining case (iii) is
excluded as well. Notice that his theory demands that (iii) include a property of
“being a himiko” as long as (i) is regarded as meaningful : whereas names are not
descriptions, or descriptive phrases. (i) could not possibly be assigned any inter-
pretations after all.
2) We reject the idea that nonbeing is possibly denied in a negative way in the in
question because it is an absurdity to talk about some things outsaide the  that
never get involved in the statement in question, and to admit entities outside the
, which means that we make reference to a complementary universe, an unknown
world for us who simply talk about the . We, strangely enough, admit entities in
the outside domain of the  should we deny nonbeing in the realm of empty .
This argument reminds us of Quine’s “old Platonic riddle of nonbeing”. Quine
(1953) says to the effect that, in order to assert that what the other admits to exist
doesn’t exist, we from scratch admit there should be entities the other asserts, and
then in the denial of the entities we will be legitimately successful. This is a con-
tradiction, for we assert denial of the entities whose existence we admit at the
same time.
3) We have scrutinized all the valid inferences but ten B-group inferences such as
Darii, Ferio, and so forth. It is easy to see if our methods predict that they all turn
out to be valid : however, we omit the detailed examinations of their validity be-
cause of space.
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On Existential Import
An Attempt in the Framework of an Aristotelian Tradition
Shin-ichi SHIMIZU
The existential import is the old but new object of inquiry. Strangely enough,
this problem has not been inquired in such a way that a solution is to be found on
more deductive ground. Our discussion is done for the salvation of Aristotelian
views, and is maily confined to the more traditional views of logic. We address
the problems of existential assumption with resptct to categorical syllogisms as
well as direct inferences ; and some hypotheses on the deduction and checking of
validity are proposed with more principle-based approaches.
